

Understanding the Socioeconomic Conditions of the Stateless Shona Community in Kenya

Results from the
2019 Socioeconomic Survey



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The UN Refugee Agency



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


Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vii
FOREWORDS	viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	x
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES	1
I. Statelessness in Kenya	2
FINDINGS	7
I. Consumption and Poverty	7
II. Demographic Profile	8
III. Access to Basic Services	11
i. Housing	11
ii. Water and sanitation	15
iii. Energy	16
iv. Education	18
IV. Employment and Livelihoods	24
V. County Trends	28
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	30
BIBLIOGRAPHY	32
APPENDIXES	34
Appendix A. Locations of Interviewed Shona Households in Kenya	34
Appendix B. Methodology	35

LIST OF TABLES

Table B.1: Households that completed the various sections of the SES questionnaire	36
Table B.2: Sample allocation for KIHBS 2015/16	36
Table B.3: Shona questionnaires for registration and SES.....	36


LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Poverty headcount (national poverty line).....	8
Figure 2: Poverty gap and severity (national poverty line).....	8
Figure 3: Gender distribution for the Shona community and Kenyans, by county.....	9
Figure 4: Demographic profile of the Shona community and Kenyans	9
Figure 5: Household size for the Shona community and Kenyans.....	10
Figure 6: Dependency ratio for the Shona community and Kenyans	10
Figure 7: Distribution of men-headed households for the Shona community and Kenyans	11
Figure 8: Proportion of improved housing for the Shona community and Kenyans	11
Figure 9: Type of roofing materials for the Shona community and Kenyans	12
Figure 10: Type of floor material for the Shona community and Kenyans.....	13
Figure 11: Type of wall material for the Shona community and Kenyans	13
Figure 12: Number of habitable rooms for the Shona community and Kenyans.....	14
Figure 13: Proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions	14
Figure 14: Access to drinking water for the Shona community and Kenyans	15
Figure 15: Access to improved sanitation for the Shona community and Kenyans	16
Figure 16: Sharing of toilet facilities for the Shona community and Kenyans	16
Figure 17: Source of lighting for the Shona community and Kenyans.....	17
Figure 18: Lower access to health facilities than before March 2020	17
Figure 19: Reasons for lower access to health facilities	17
Figure 20: Distribution of population attended school, ages 15 and above.....	18
Figure 21: Primary attendance rates for the Shona community and nationals by county	19
Figure 22: Primary attendance rates, by county and gender	19
Figure 23: Secondary attendance rates by county	20
Figure 24: Secondary school attendance rates, by county and gender	20
Figure 25: Educational achievement by county (15 years+, not currently attending)	21
Figure 26: Educational achievement by county and gender (15 years+, not currently attending)...	21
Figure 27: Population distribution, by ability to read and write in any language	22
Figure 28: Population distribution among the Shona community, by literacy in official languages..	22
Figure 29: Engagement in learning activities in the last seven days.....	23
Figure 30: Main learning-related activities	24
Figure 31: Labor force participation for the Shona community and Kenyans	24
Figure 32: Type of work activity in the last seven days, for Shona and nationals	26
Figure 33: Type of work activity in the last seven days by gender, for Shona and nationals.....	26
Figure 34: Main reason for not working or looking for a job in last four weeks	27

Figure 35: Employed in the last seven days	27
Figure 36: Changes in revenue among the self-employed	28
Figure 37: Changes in earnings among paid employees	28
Figure A.1: Map of location of interviewed Shona households in Kenya.....	34
Figure B.1: Poverty headcount for the Shona community and Kenyans (international poverty line)	38

LIST OF BOXES

Box 1: Methodological summary	5
Box 2: Kenya COVID-19 rapid response phone surveys.....	6
Box 3: Poverty calculation	7
Box 4: Kenya RRPS insights on access to health facilities.....	17
Box 5: Kenya RRPS insights on education	23
Box 6: Labor force participation	25
Box 7: Kenya RRPS insights on employment	27



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List of Abbreviations

DIS	Department of Immigration Services
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EHAGL	East and Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes
GoK	Government of Kenya
KCHS	Kenya Continuous Household Survey
KCIA	Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act
KIHBS	Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
RRPS	Rapid Response Phone Survey
SES	Socioeconomic Survey
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene



Forewords

Around the world, millions of people are stateless, as they do not hold the nationality of any country. Their precise number is not known due to lack of official data, but UNHCR estimates that there are 4.2 million or more globally. In Kenya, there are about 18,500 stateless people.

While the likely negative impact of statelessness on the socioeconomic status of affected populations can be intuitively understood, there is an urgent need to address the existing data gap in order to measure the disparities between those with and those without a nationality. High-quality disaggregated socioeconomic data will inform government policy making and monitoring in this area. Development actors also need better information about the impact of statelessness in order to prioritize it appropriately.

This new study on the stateless Shona population, an ethnic group with origins in present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia that has been present in Kenya for multiple generations, is a groundbreaking first step in this regard. The study was conducted by UNHCR and the World Bank, in collaboration with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, and is aligned with the broader efforts of the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement to expand the collection of socioeconomic data on affected populations and host communities. It reveals disparities in terms of the Shona community's household characteristics, housing conditions, education, employment, and consumption and expenditure, in comparison with Kenyan nationals living in the same areas. Some of the disparities include:

- The poverty rate among the Shona is 24 percent higher than in the urban Kenyan population.
- Access to education is lower for the Shona than for Kenyan nationals, a situation that threatens human capital development and economic growth.
- The lack of citizenship and identity documents hinders the Shona from securing formal jobs and leaves them with no option other than to engage in informal employment to survive.

Kenya has taken important steps toward resolving the issue of statelessness in the country. In 2019, at a high-level event on statelessness co-organized by the Government of Kenya, the Executive Secretariat of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, and UNHCR, the government pledged to recognize the Shona as Kenyan citizens. The data in this study, prior to citizenship, are thus timely, as development gains due to acquisition of nationality may be observed in the near future.

Sustainable development can only be achieved if all people have a chance to fulfil their potential without any barriers. It is therefore crucial that the international community steps up collective efforts to promote inclusive economic growth, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), that meets the needs of both stateless people and nationals and ensures that no one will be left behind.

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The right to a nationality is a fundamental human right that has been denied to millions of people in the world. Stateless persons are not considered nationals of any state, and thus are officially ‘inexistent’. Stateless people are not only deprived from their right to a nationality but are subject to several other human rights violations and restrictions to access health, education, and livelihood opportunities. As people with no nationality are administratively ‘invisible’, it is extremely difficult to estimate the exact number of stateless people. The living conditions, aspirations, and challenges they face are equally unknown, which severely hinders efforts to develop policy and programmatic responses to effectively address their needs.

In Kenya, at least 18,500 people live in statelessness. The Shona community comprises more than 3,500 of them, whose families arrived in Kenya from modern-day Zimbabwe and Zambia. As in other regions in the world, data on stateless persons in Kenya are scarce. To help design evidence-based policy interventions for the Shona population, the UNHCR and the World Bank, in collaboration with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, carried out the present socioeconomic survey (SES). In addition to creating evidence for policy decisions, the undertaking provides lessons learned to collect socioeconomic data of stateless persons in similar settings.

The Shona SES provides an overall picture of the socioeconomic conditions of Kenya’s stateless Shona communities compared to nationals in the neighboring counties of Nairobi and Kiambu. While offering a comparative outline of stateless people and nationals, the SES acknowledges both communities’ needs and offers evidence-based recommendations: first, collecting socioeconomic data of stateless people that are comparable to that of nationals can help design effective development policy to help lift their living standards. Second, building and maintaining human capital among the Shona community, especially among girls and women, needs to be prioritized. Third, understanding barriers to formal employment and increasing work opportunities for the Shona community can help improve their livelihoods. Fourth, ensuring that the right to a nationality is fulfilled can not only improve the living standards of stateless people but also of nationals.

Acknowledging stateless communities by understanding their socioeconomic conditions can contribute to designing effective policy interventions to end statelessness and give voice to the ‘invisible’.

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Executive Summary

Statelessness is a global challenge affecting millions of people who face multiple legal and socio-economic deprivations that can last for generations. At least 4.2 million people live in statelessness (UNHCR 2020).¹ “The very nature of statelessness means it is difficult to determine exactly how many people are affected, or at risk,” and therefore, the true number could be three times higher (United Nations 2018). Without a nationality or citizenship, individuals are often denied access to basic human rights, such as education, health, documentation, employment, marriage, and freedom of movement. As one-third of the known stateless population are children and young adults, without remedying their statelessness, this population is sentenced to a lifetime of social and economic deprivations.

Pursuant to its mandate to identify, prevent, and reduce statelessness, UNHCR and the Government of Kenya have initiated steps to resolve statelessness in the country—however, socioeconomic data gaps hinder efforts to design targeted policy interventions. UNHCR has set out the Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014–2024, and launched the #IBelong Campaign,² resulting in the acquisition or confirmation of the nationality of more than 166,000 stateless persons. As part of these efforts, UNHCR and the Government of Kenya (GoK) initiated a series of steps to address statelessness in the country. Such efforts have resulted in a pledge to ensure the protection of stateless persons, the naturalization of the Makonde community, and an agreement to naturalize qualifying members of the Shona community. However, scarce socioeconomic information of stateless populations that is comparable to nationals prevents a deeper understanding of their living conditions, hence hindering efforts to design targeted policy aimed at solving statelessness.

The Shona SES provides comparable socioeconomic profiles for the Shona community and nationals, while contributing toward informing a targeted response to address the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Together with the Department of Immigration Services (DIS) and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) of the GoK, UNHCR Kenya, with technical support from the World Bank, conducted a preregistration exercise and socioeconomic survey for the Shona community. The Shona SES marks one of the first quantitative studies of a stateless population that is based on a national socioeconomic assessment tool. The SES compares the living conditions of the Shona community residing in Nairobi and urban Kiambu counties to the conditions of Kenyan nationals in such counties, as well as to the national urban average.³ This approach does not attempt to establish a causal connection between their legal status and living conditions. It does, however, provide evidence that shows strong correlations between statelessness, access to rights, and key indicators of well-being. In addition, the SES links its findings to the results of the first wave of the Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys (RRPS) designed to assess the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on nationals, refugees, and stateless persons.

¹ Based on the information available from 76 countries.

² <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/statelessness/54621bf49/global-action-plan-end-statelessness-2014-2024.html>

³ Results from the Shona survey are compared to those from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and its Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2015/16.

Compared to Kenyan nationals, the Shona community is poorer; has larger household sizes and lives in crowded conditions; has lower access to secondary education; is more likely to be self-employed; and has been heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Shona community has a 24 percent higher chance of being poor than the urban Kenyan population. Over half of the Shona community (53 percent) live below the national urban poverty line, compared to 29 percent of the broader urban population and 36 percent of all Kenyans (urban and rural). Similar trends are observed at the county levels. In Kiambu County, 56 percent of the Shona community live below the national poverty line, compared to 25 percent of urban nationals. In Nairobi County, 49 percent of the Shona community live below the poverty line compared with 17 percent of Kenyans. These discrepancies lead to a higher incidence and severity of poverty among the Shona community than nationals as measured by the poverty gap (17 percent vs. 10 percent) and poverty severity (7 percent vs. 5 percent). The poverty gap is crucial for estimating the minimum amount needed to eliminate poverty. For the 1,616 Shona community individuals covered in this report, it would cost an estimated US\$122 per person per year to raise incomes to meet the national urban poverty line. These poverty rates are likely to increase as a result of the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Shona community households tend to be larger in size and contain a greater share of dependents than urban Kenyan households, whose households are mostly headed by men. Compared to Kenyans living in urban areas, the Shona community has the same proportion of elders in their households, but a higher share of children than urban nationals (49 percent vs. 41 percent). While every Shona of working age is responsible for one dependent, two working-age Kenyans are responsible for one dependent (0.6 vs. 0.9, $p < 0.01$). This higher incidence of dependents translates into a higher economic burden on the working-age Shona population. The Shona community and national households both report gender imbalances in who manages the household, as men from both groups are more likely to make daily decisions in the household than women.

The Shona community has similar access to improved water and sanitation compared to Kenyan nationals, but lower access at the county level and Shona households more often live in crowded conditions. Shona community households have equal access to improved drinking water as urban nationals (88 percent), but more than 50 percent of the Shona community households report regular shortages. At the county level, the Shona community households in Nairobi and Kiambu have lower access to improved drinking water than Kenyans living in the same counties (85 percent vs. 98 percent in Nairobi; 90 percent vs. 97 percent in Kiambu). Access to improved sanitation among the Shona community is lower than that of urban nationals (83 percent vs. 87 percent) but higher for Shona households in Nairobi. Shona households are more likely to share toilet facilities with other households than nationals. The Shona community households tend to live in more crowded conditions than urban Kenyan households, with an average household size among the Shona of 4.9 persons vs. 3.3 persons in urban Kenya.

About 9 in 10 Shona community households report access to the electricity grid, compared to 6 in 10 urban households in Kenya at the national level. It is likely that the access rate for urban Kenyan households at the national level is lower than that of Shona households because this group includes households in smaller cities far away from the capital. Thus, they may have lower access than the areas surrounding the capital of Nairobi, where the Shona community resides. When comparing access to

lighting powered by the electricity grid in Nairobi County, both the Shona and Kenyans report almost the same level of access (90 percent vs. 91 percent).

While a nominal difference in primary education is observed for the Shona community compared to nationals, the difference is more pronounced at the secondary level. Primary school attendance is slightly lower for Shona children ages 6–13 years compared to urban Kenyan children (81 percent vs. 86 percent). At the secondary level, urban nationals are almost twice as likely to be attending school than their Shona peers (50 percent vs. 28 percent). Among the Shona, there is a significant gender gap in secondary educational attainment, with 20 percent of men having some secondary or higher education compared to 11 percent of women. For urban Kenyans, the gender gap is smaller, although men are likely to be more highly educated than women. The lower transition to secondary school for the Shona may partly be explained by the fact that a birth certificate is required to register for primary 8 (the last grade in primary) in order to continue to the secondary level. Moreover, as the employment rate for Shona youth is higher than that of nationals, low secondary school attendance can also be explained by the high opportunity cost of going to school, suggesting that Shona youth may drop out of school to enter the labor market. The COVID-19 pandemic has translated into zero attendance for the Shona, thus posing additional challenges to building human capital.

Literacy rates for the Shona community are high, but slightly lower than the national urban average and vary significantly by gender. While 89 percent of the Shona population report being able to read and write in at least one language, 93 percent of urban nationals can do so. Male Shonas report a slightly higher literacy rate at 93 percent, compared to 85 percent of women. In contrast, urban national rates are 95 percent and 91 percent for men and women, respectively. Considering the two official languages in Kenya, English and Swahili, more than 75 percent of the Shona community population can read and write in at least one of them: English (74 percent) and Swahili (87 percent).

The employment rate of the Shona community is higher than for urban nationals, although this does not translate into lower poverty rates; most of the employed Shona are self-employed. Most of the working-age Shona population is employed, which is slightly higher than the urban Kenyan average (73 percent vs. 69 percent). However, the Shona poverty rate remains higher than for nationals. Moreover, nearly 8 in 10 Shona employed are self-employed compared to only 3 in 10 among nationals. Such a differing trend may be explained by the lack of identity documents needed to access the formal employment market, which may force most of the Shona community to engage in self-employment to earn a living. Only 2 percent of the Shona report being unemployed, which is in line with the 4 percent of urban Kenyans, whereas 24 percent are outside the labor force (OLF) compared to the national urban average of 27 percent.

The findings from the Shona SES also reflect differences in intra-household bargaining power among men and women. Overall, Shona community women are less likely to be involved in decision making, be less educated, and have lower labor force participation. Women and girls in the Shona community have lower overall educational attainment, attendance, and literacy rates than Shona men and boys. In addition, when the two official languages in Kenya are considered, fewer women can speak Swahili and English than men. While higher literacy is associated with higher levels of education and socioeconomic standing, proficiency in an official language of Kenya may help facilitate integration into the local community and employment opportunities. This implies that the lower literacy rate among women can

hinder their access to better economic opportunities, including barriers to accessing local employment opportunities and education. Indeed, women in the Shona community report having lower labor force participation rates than men, and are more likely to be outside the labor force, often citing their role as homemakers.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic worsened the livelihoods and access to services of the Shona. Results from the Kenya RRPS show that employment rates, earnings, and business revenues have dropped sharply since the pandemic outbreak in March 2020. While 73 percent of the Shona were employed before the COVID-19 pandemic, only 22 percent were employed as of July 2020. The decrease in hours worked by the few that were formerly employed before the outbreak and the temporary closure of businesses have tremendously affected wages and revenues. In addition, even though the majority of Shona children (66 percent) are engaged in some form of learning activities at home due to school closures, the means of learning raises questions of efficacy. Access to e-learning platforms as recommended by the GoK is low, and learning activities are mainly done through the reading of school textbooks. Furthermore, access to health facilities compared to before the pandemic outbreak has also decreased, due mainly to fear of contracting the virus.

The SES provide the following policy recommendations while offering options to help mitigate the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on stateless communities:

- 1. Strengthening job-related skills, increasing work opportunities, and understanding barriers to formal employment can help improve living standards among the Shona community.** Strengthening job-related skills through programs linked to work opportunities can be instrumental in increasing employment rates and addressing market needs. Evidently, facilitating issuance of identity documents and work permits can also enhance access to formal employment. Furthermore, a deeper understanding of barriers to formal employment can help inform targeted policies to improve livelihoods. A gender-responsive approach must be integrated to ensure women's participation in the paid labor market.
- 2. Building and maintaining human capital among the Shona community, especially among girls and women, emerges as a policy priority.** Substantial investment is needed to build and maintain human capital by improving access to education and supporting the transition to secondary school, especially among secondary school-age children. Removing the requirements of identity documents to enroll in education and enhancing access to income generating opportunities among adults of nonschool age will be key in supporting access to education for Shona children and youth. Easing access to education will be key in mitigating the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- 3. Investing in health, education, and livelihood strategies can help mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.** Ensuring access to safe health care for non-COVID-19-related health concerns can help reduce the risk of future health crises and overwhelming the health system. On education, providing homeschooling materials and increasing access to e-learning can support children's education and keep students from falling behind. Finally, targeted cash transfers, increased access to financial services, and information campaigns on existing support programs can help reduce negative impacts on livelihoods.

4. **Recognizing and registering the Shona stateless community can have a positive impact, not only on the socioeconomic lives of stateless persons, but on Kenyans overall.** Even though the Kenyan government has taken steps to address the issue by establishing a national taskforce for the identification and registration of eligible stateless persons as Kenyan citizens, a significant amount of work still lies ahead. Direct government interventions, and further advocacy can support the integration of this community into social services, the formal labor market, and ultimately the socioeconomic development of the nation.



Background and Objectives

1. Despite laws safeguarding rights to citizenship and providing pathways toward regularization for longstanding residents, millions of people in the world are denied a nationality. The 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons defines a ‘stateless person’ as one “who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” (UNHCR 2005).⁴ According to Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness form the foundation of the international legal framework to prevent and address statelessness (United Nations 1961). Despite legal frameworks and efforts to reduce statelessness, at least 4.2 million people are reported as stateless based on data available from 76 countries (UNHCR 2020). However, the true global figure is estimated to be significantly higher.

2. Statelessness usually starts in childhood, bringing along multiple legal and socioeconomic deprivations that can last for generations. As many countries around the world observe a *jus sanguinis* (“right of blood”) nationality regime whereby citizenship is determined by the nationality or citizenship of one or both parents, children of stateless parents ‘inherit’ such a status (Kohn and Gurd 2011). Without a nationality or citizenship, individuals are often denied access to basic human rights, such as education, health, documentation, employment, marriage, and freedom of movement. An estimated one-third of stateless persons are children—without the legal protection that comes with citizenship this minority group is sentenced to a lifetime of social and economic inequity associated with the lack of access to fundamental rights.

3. UNHCR is mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to identify and protect stateless persons and to prevent and reduce statelessness globally. Statelessness and displacement are deeply interlinked, as the former can cause the latter (Norwegian Refugee Council 2015).⁵ Such a link initially led the United Nations General Assembly to ask UNHCR in 1975 to provide assistance to individuals under the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.⁶ Through a series of resolutions beginning in 1995, UNHCR was officially designated as the agency responsible for overseeing the prevention and reduction of statelessness. Pursuant to this mandate, in consultation with states, civil society, and international organizations, UNHCR has set out the Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014–2024, and launched the #IBelong Campaign (UNHCR 2017a). Since the launch of the #IBelong

⁴ While nationality is acquired through birth, adoption, marriage, or descent, citizenship is granted to an individual by the government of the country when he or she complies with the legal formalities: in doing so, citizenship or nationality not only provides people with a sense of identity, it entitles individuals to the protection of a state and to many civil and political rights (UNHCR 2005).

⁵ For example, many Rohingyas, despite living in Rakhine for generations, were forced to leave their homes for safety in nearby countries due to a revision in Myanmar citizen law in 1982. The revision of the law deprived them of their nationality, restricting their freedom of movement, access to education, health, employment, and land ownership. https://files.institutesi.org/stateless_displacement_brief.pdf

⁶ The 1961 Convention, which complements the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons, is the leading international instrument that sets rules for the conferral and non-withdrawal of citizenship to prevent cases of statelessness from arising by setting out rules to limit the occurrence of statelessness.

Campaign, more than 166,000 stateless persons have acquired or had their nationality confirmed, and many states have complied with the statelessness convention resolutions. In 2019, UNHCR convened a High-Level Segment on Statelessness that generated 360 pledges of concrete actions, most of which were delivered by states.⁷ Despite these achievements, the challenge of identifying stateless persons and those at risk contributes to the prevalence of statelessness (UNHCR 2018).

4. Statelessness remains a significant, yet inadequately documented problem in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the second largest hosting region of stateless persons in the world, after Asia and the Pacific.⁸ From the limited data available to UNHCR, 23 percent of the world's stateless persons (974,988) live in this region, of whom some 98 percent live in West and Central Africa compared to 2 percent in the East and Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes (EHAGL) region (UNHCR 2019). Despite the large number of stateless persons in this region, governments in Africa have only recently recognized it as a serious problem and many are now taking steps to address it.⁹ However, the scope of the problem still remains poorly documented due to, among other reasons, the common misconception that all refugees are stateless and the overlap between the official stateless population and the much larger population of undocumented persons who are unaware of their official nationality status (Mules 2019). Therefore, important socioeconomic data gaps on statelessness persist.

I. Statelessness in Kenya

5. Kenya is home to an estimated 18,500 stateless persons, making it the largest hosting nation in the EHAGL region.¹⁰ In Kenya, there are different groups of stateless persons, including the Pemba, Galjael, Shona, and groups of individuals of Burundian, Congolese, Indian, and Rwandan descent, many of whom have been in the country for decades or even generations. These populations inherited statelessness from their ancestors, as the Kenyan Constitution at the time of independence lacked a provision for the recognition of stateless persons as Kenyans (UNHCR 2017b). The revised 2010 Kenya Constitution gives prominence to citizenship, which is implemented by the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Acts (KCIA) of 2011. Section 15 of the KCIA 2011 indicates that stateless persons living in Kenya for a continuous period since December 12, 1963, may be considered for citizenship upon fulfilling set criteria.¹¹ However, a lack of information on the existence of this legislation and unfamiliarity with the process, as well as the inability to invoke the relevant registration provisions, still leave many in statelessness. While the constitution also guarantees every child the right to a name and nationality from birth, it does not include specific safeguards to protect individuals from statelessness.¹²

⁷ For a complete list of pledges, see <https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/results-of-the-high-level-segment-on-statelessness/>

⁸ Statelessness in Africa is deeply embedded in discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or gender; the transfer of territory between existing states, conflicting nationality laws; and migration, nomadism, and forced displacement (Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion 2017).

⁹ For instance, the African Human Rights System, a composition of several human rights treaties between African Union Member States, has developed its position and guidance on the right to nationality, while the Abidjan Declaration by the Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has shown that there is a political will to eradicate statelessness.

¹⁰ The estimated number of stateless persons is derived from the communities.

¹¹ Kenya: s.15 of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act, 2011, Act No. 11 of 2011, 30 August 2011, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4fd9a3082.html>

¹² For instance, it does not contain adequate guarantees to ensure that children of stateless persons who would otherwise be stateless can acquire nationality (Abuya 2010).

6. Birth certificates are the key supporting documents for citizenship applications in Kenya. Birth registration is a two-step process: first, parents need a birth notification from the health care facility where the child is born and from the local administrative authority for those born at home. Second, parents need to apply for a birth certificate at the civil registrar's office within six months, during which time no supporting document is required apart from birth notification. Late birth registration applications (those done after six months) are at the discretion of the principal registrar and require the submission of additional supporting documents, such as a passport or identity card which stateless persons do not have. The lack of information to register children in a timely manner leads to heightened risks of childhood statelessness. In addition, childhood statelessness is exacerbated by the limited number of birth registration centers in the sub-counties, extreme poverty among affected persons, the higher cost of late birth registration, ethnic discrimination, and fear of authorities due to past expulsion of stateless communities (UNHCR 2017b).

7. Positive steps are being taken by the government to improve civil registration. In January 2019, the government established the National Integrated Identity Management System (NIIMS) with the purpose of integrating and managing a central population database.¹³ In May 2019, the government began to collect data from all persons in the country, including non-Kenyans, with the aim of issuing a personal identifier known as Huduma Namba, which would provide access to services that non-Kenyans were not entitled to before. At the same time, the Civil Registration Services intensified its efforts of increasing birth registration through the Rapid Results Initiative. The GoK, in collaboration with UNHCR, UNICEF, and the NGO Haki na Sheria Initiative, organized mobile birth registration exercises in 11 Early Childhood Development Centers, issuing birth certificates to 1,524 children.

8. The GoK's commitment to resolving statelessness has resulted in a pledge to ensure the protection of stateless persons, the naturalization of the Makonde community, and an agreement to naturalize qualifying members of the Shona community. During the Global Refugee Forum in December 2019, the GoK pledged to ensure the protection of stateless persons, committing to implementing a new act that would provide safeguards to prevent statelessness by 2020. Likewise, it pledged to accede to the UN statelessness conventions. Furthermore, in 2016, the Makonde community¹⁴ was recognized as Kenyan nationals, officially making them Kenya's 43rd tribe. In 2019, at the Ministerial Conference on the Eradication of Statelessness in the Great Lakes Region, the GoK agreed to expand this initiative to qualifying members of the Shona community.

9. The Shona community comprises more than 3,500 stateless persons whose ancestors arrived in Kenya from modern-day Zimbabwe and Zambia between the 1950s and 1970s. According to the Shona elders, when they arrived in Kenya, they did not plan to return to their country of origin, as the gaining of independence by Kenya motivated them to settle and continue their missionary work in the country. Upon arrival, the Shona were issued certificates of registration under the Alien Restriction Act. However, a change in the Registration of Persons Act of 1978 prevented them from accessing identity cards. As a result, most of those who were among the first wave of arrivals do not hold valid legal identity documents. At the same time, Zimbabwe and Zambia do not consider them as nationals since many

¹³ The database contains information of all Kenyan citizens and foreign nationals residing in Kenya and serves as a reference point for ease of service delivery to the people in Kenya.

¹⁴ An ethnic minority with origins in northern Mozambique who moved to Kenya before independence.

of those who were born there did not have their births registered and lost all traces of their ancestry since they never returned, hence rendering them stateless (UNHCR Kenya 2017).¹⁵

10. The Shona preregistration and Socioeconomic Survey (SES) serve the continued efforts to resolve statelessness in Kenya, while adding new evidence on the socioeconomic conditions of stateless persons that is key for evidence-based policy planning and programming.¹⁶

While two previous studies on the Makonde and Pemba communities provide information on the number and characteristics of stateless communities, little information is available on the Shona.¹⁷ The Makonde study led to the registration of the Makonde as Kenyans in 2016; however, it provided few insights on their socioeconomic conditions. This left a knowledge gap on the relationship between statelessness and well-being, which is essential for evidence-based policy interventions.¹⁸ With the aim of contributing to filling this gap, in collaboration with the Department of Immigration Services (DIS) and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) of the GoK, UNHCR Kenya, with technical support from the World Bank, conducted a preregistration exercise and socioeconomic survey for the Shona community living in Nairobi and Kiambu counties between May and July 2019. While the objective of the registration was for the GoK to prepare the application for citizenship of qualifying members,¹⁹ the SES was carried out to understand the socioeconomic conditions of the Shona community compared to those of nationals.

11. The Shona SES provides comparable socioeconomic profiles for the Shona community and nationals while contributing toward informing a targeted response to address the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁰

As part of the socioeconomic household survey series to understand the living conditions of refugees and persons of concern to the UNHCR in Kenya, the Shona SES provides a comprehensive snapshot of the economic lives of the Shona community and the broader national population. The SES presented here compares the living conditions of the Shona community residing in Nairobi and Kiambu counties to the conditions of Kenyan nationals in such counties, as well as to the national urban average (Box 1). Thus, by providing one of the first comparative socioeconomic profiles of nationals and stateless persons, it enables the design of evidence-informed programming and development policy. The SES links its findings to the results of the first wave of the Kenya COVID-19 Rapid Response Phone Surveys (RRPS) (Box 2).

¹⁵ UNHCR became aware of the Shona community in 2016 through several news reports and meetings with the Shona community leaders.

¹⁶ <https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/makonde-in-kenya/>

¹⁷ UNHCR (2016a, 2016b).

¹⁸ Limited information is available on planned socioeconomic surveys with representative samples. Nevertheless, thanks to the #IBelong Campaign and to the collaborative work of diverse stakeholders, further quantitative research is expected to be carried out.

¹⁹ This included documenting migration history, residence in Kenya, family circumstances, and available documentation.

²⁰ The UNHCR carried out a preregistration.

The results presented in this report are based on data gathered from households of the Shona community living in Nairobi and Kiambu counties. The Shona SES occurred concurrently with the preregistration data collection activity, which aimed to interview all Shona households in Kenya. Therefore, no sampling frame was used. UNHCR and the Shona community leaders estimate that there were some 3,500 individuals, although the preregistration activity interviewed only 2,084 individuals (equivalent to 465 households). These households were identified through household listings, with the help of Shona community elders as key informants. The Shona were initially identified to be living in four main areas in Nairobi and Kiambu counties: Githurai and Hurlingham in Nairobi, and Kiambaa and Kinoo in urban Kiambu. The four areas included only urban households.²¹ Households in Hurlingham were excluded because they are part of a religious order who maintain significantly different living conditions than the average population (see details in Appendix B, Table B.1). This report covers 1,616 Shona community individuals forming 328 households.

The questionnaire used in the Shona SES produces data comparable to national household surveys and other standard instruments. Modules on education, employment, household characteristics, and consumption and expenditure are aligned with the most recent national poverty survey, the 2015/16 KIHBS, and provides comparable results reported at the county and national levels.²² Questions are also aligned with the KCHS which, since 2019, collects comparable statistics on an annual basis for all counties in Kenya. The poverty level of the stateless Shona community is estimated by using the full consumption module used by KNBS. Households were defined using KNBS' guidelines as a group of people who live together, share meals, and recognize the same and only one head of household among them. In addition to this, the household must have at least one person who identifies as Shona, that is, was either born in Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, or Zambia, or can be linked to these countries through past or current marriage or direct ancestors who migrated to Kenya.²³ However, this definition does not require an individual to be stateless, as the main goal was to study the Shona community who are likely to be affected by statelessness and to advocate for citizenship on their behalf.

Comparability between the Shona community and nationals can be limited. First, the comparison is limited by a gap of four to five years between the Shona SES data and the KIHBS 2015/16 data, during which national averages might have changed considerably. Secondly,

²¹ The pilot study revealed the migration of some members of the community to other counties, mainly Meru and Mombasa, whereas others had moved to other areas within Nairobi and Kiambu counties. Households located in Meru and Mombasa were excluded from the analysis in order to maintain representativeness of the households in the main study areas.

²² Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), 2015/16 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS). <http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/nada/index.php/catalog/88>

²³ This filter was applied at the listing stage.

a smaller population of the Shona community who live closer to the capital are being compared to a larger group of urban nationals spread across the country. This can also affect the differences between the Shona community data and the KIHBS data aside from statelessness. Comparisons were done only at the urban level, thus only urban Kenyan households at the national and county levels were compared to urban Shona households (see national sample size in Appendix B, Table B.2).

BOX 2

Kenya COVID-19 rapid response phone surveys

The Kenya RRPS is designed to respond to the urgent need for timely data and evidence to help monitor and mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The World Bank, together with the KNBS and UNHCR, and in collaboration with the University of California Berkeley, designed and implemented the high frequency phone survey to measure the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic on nationals, refugees, and stateless people. The RRPS collects bimonthly data on knowledge about COVID-19, behavior changes, income loss, safety nets, access to medicine and food, employment, food security, coping mechanisms, and concerns. The RRPS recently completed the first of three data collection rounds, including a sample of about 1,250 refugees and stateless people in the Kalobeyei settlement, Kakuma camps, Dadaab camps, Nairobi, and the Shona community. This report includes selected preliminary results on health, education, and livelihoods for the Shona community, refugees living in urban Nairobi, and nationals, while providing relevant recommendations. More details on the Kenya RRPS as well as a results dashboard can be accessed through the Kenya COVID-19 tracker website (www.kenyacovidtracker.org).²⁴

²⁴ The statistics on nationals exclude refugees and Shona stateless persons. Thus, they differ slightly from statistics on the entire population of Kenya, which includes refugees and Shona stateless people, used in other publications based on the 2020 Kenya COVID-19 RRPS.

I. Consumption and Poverty²⁵

12. More than half of the Shona community population is poor, and they are 17 percentage points more likely to be poorer than the average Kenyan national. About 53 percent of the Shona population lives below the national poverty line of US\$59.95 per month, which is higher than the national average of 36 percent ($p < 0.01$) and national urban average of 29 percent ($p < 0.01$; Figure 1; see Figure B.1 for international poverty rate). This is also true at the county level, the Shona community living in Nairobi is almost three times poorer than their national counterparts (49 percent vs. 17 percent, $p < 0.01$) while in Kiambu, 56 percent of them are poor compared to 25 percent of Kenyans living in that county ($p < 0.01$).

13. As a result of the higher poverty headcount, the incidence and depth of poverty are greater among the Shona community than among Kenyans. The poverty gap is greater for the Shona community than for nationals (17 percent vs. 10 percent, $p < 0.01$; Figure 2). For the Shona community and Kenyans living in Kiambu, the poverty gap for the stateless population is about two times the nationals'


BOX 3

Poverty calculation

Poverty is defined as a level of consumption at which a person's minimum basic needs cannot be met. Three measures of poverty are used in this report—the poverty headcount, poverty gap, and poverty severity. Poverty headcount, the most widely used poverty metric, simply measures the proportion of the population that is poor. Poverty gap estimates the average extent by which poor individuals fall below the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. Simply put, the poverty gap indicates how far away the poor are from escaping poverty and can also be considered a very crude measurement of the cost of eliminating monetary poverty. Poverty gap squared measures the severity of poverty by considering inequality among the poor. It is simply a weighted sum of poverty gaps, where the weights are the proportionate poverty gaps themselves. This report uses the national poverty line for urban areas since all the study areas are classified as urban—thus households and individuals are considered to be poor if their monthly adult equivalent total consumption expenditure per person is less than K Sh 5,995 (or US\$59.95 PPP).


²⁵ Graphs and charts for Shona estimates were created based on the Shona SES 2019 data. Graphs and charts depicting national information were created based on the KIHBS 2015/2016, (KNBS 2015/16). Comparisons between Shona and nationals include significance levels reported as p-values with 1 percent ($p < .01$) and 5 percent ($p < .05$) levels considered significant. Error bars in graphs display standard error estimates. As the Shona data represent a population census, neither error bars nor p values are included for comparisons between Shona only.

► **FIGURE 1:** Poverty headcount (national poverty line)



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 2:** Poverty gap and severity (national poverty line)




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

($p < 0.01$). For those living in Nairobi County, the gap for the Shona is about five times what is observed for Kenyans ($p < 0.01$). The poverty severity among the Shona community is 8 percent compared to 5 percent for urban Kenyans ($p < 0.01$; Figure 2). The poverty gap can be used as a rough estimation of the cost of household cash transfers required to eliminate poverty. In this case, eradicating poverty among the Shona community would require a monthly transfer of K Sh 1,019 (2015/16 PPP) which is equivalent to an annual transfer of K Sh 12,230 (US\$122.30) to each person. Based on this estimate, it would cost about US\$197,636 per year to eradicate poverty for the entire group of Shona people considered in this report.

II. Demographic Profile


14. Similar to nationals, the distribution of Shona community men and women across different counties is even. Among the Shona community living in Kiambu and Nairobi counties, 51 percent are men and 49 percent are women. Comparing with Kenyans living in urban areas, there are as many men as women ($p < 0.405$; Figure 3). Disaggregating at the county level, there are no significant differences, as gender distribution is equally split for both the Shona population and Kenyans in these counties.

► **FIGURE 3:** Gender distribution for the Shona community and Kenyans, by county



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).


► **FIGURE 4:** Demographic profile of the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

15. The Shona community population is younger—almost half are below 18 years old but have the same proportion of elders as urban Kenyans. Among the Shona population, about 49 percent are below 18 years old, which is greater than the national urban average of 41 percent ($p < 0.01$). However, the proportion of elders (65 years and above) in urban Kenya (2 percent) is the same as what is observed among the Shona community (Figure 4). Compared to Shona community men, the shape of the population pyramid for Shona women depicts more irregularities, reflecting a larger proportion of girls and women ages 10 to 24 years. Similar to urban Kenyans, the median age for Shona men and women is 18 years old,

► **FIGURE 5:** Household size for the Shona community and Kenyans




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

while for Kenyans it is 18 years for men and 19 years for women. Among urban Kenyans, there is a larger proportion of the population within the 20–34 age groups and relatively fewer children.


16. The Shona community households are larger in size and have two more members on average, and the working population bears more economic burden than urban Kenyans. The average Shona community household size is 4.9 compared to 3.3 in urban Kenya ($p < 0.01$; Figure 5). Only 12 percent of the Shona community households are made up of one or two members compared to 43 percent of Kenyan urban households ($p < 0.01$). In contrast, 49 percent of Shona households are comprised of five or more household members compared to 25 percent of urban Kenyans ($p < 0.01$). These patterns can also be observed at the county level, as the Shona community households in Kiambu and Nairobi are larger in size than national residents of such counties (Figure 5). In addition to the larger size of Shona households, the larger number of dependents leads to the Shona working age population bearing more economic burden than urban nationals. As measured by the household dependency ratio, every working-age Shona is responsible for one dependent compared to two working-age nationals, who are responsible for one dependent (0.9 vs. 0.6, $p < 0.01$; Figure 6). In Nairobi and Kiambu, the Shona communities also

► **FIGURE 6:** Dependency ratio for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 7:** Distribution of men-headed households for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

have larger dependency ratios than nationals in their respective counties: while one Shona is responsible for one dependent in Kiambu and Nairobi, two Kenyans are responsible for only one dependent ($p < 0.01$).

17. For both the Shona and nationals, the daily decisions in most households are made by men.


Among the Shona community, about 8 in 10 households are headed by men compared to 7 in 10 in urban Kenya ($p < 0.01$; Figure 7). At the county levels, both the Shona community and national households have similar rates of households headed by men. In Kiambu and Nairobi counties, the rates of men heading households are nearly the same for Shona and national households (77 percent and 78 percent in Kiambu; 75 percent and 76 percent in Nairobi, correspondingly).

III. Access to Basic Services

i. Housing


18. More than half of Shona houses are constructed with improved housing materials, similar to what is observed among nationals (Figure 8). Having improved housing could be an effective preventive intervention for vector-borne diseases such as malaria, and other respiratory infections (Florey

► **FIGURE 8:** Proportion of improved housing for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 9:** Type of roofing materials for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).


and Taylor 2016). The types of wall, roof, and floor materials used for the construction of residential dwellings are used to determine the classification of housing as improved or unimproved based on classification from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) Analytical Studies.²⁶ Based on this classification, about 6 in 10 Shona houses are improved; however, differences exist among counties. Less than half of Shona houses in Kiambu County are made of improved materials, lower than what is observed for nationals in the same county ($p < 0.01$). In turn, in Nairobi County, Shona houses are more likely to be built with improved materials than national houses.

19. Iron roofing is common on houses among both the Shona community and Kenyans. This is more common in Kiambu County than in Nairobi County (90 percent vs. 75 percent; Figure 9). The use of concrete for roofs is more common among Shona households in Nairobi (23 percent) than in Kiambu (5 percent). The same patterns are observed among urban Kenyans: on average, about 80 percent of houses use corrugated iron sheets for their roofs. The rate is higher in Kiambu than in Nairobi (81 percent vs. 62 percent, $p < 0.01$), although not as high as that of Shona households in both locations. Notably, about 35 percent of Kenyan houses in Nairobi have concrete roofs compared to 17 percent in Kiambu ($p < 0.01$).

20. The majority of both the Shona community and Kenyan houses have cement floors; however, cement floors are more common among the Shona community houses. About 84 percent of the Shona community houses are floored with cement compared to 69 percent of households in urban Kenya ($p < 0.01$; Figure 10). The use of earth, sand, or dung (or a combination of these) is also quite common among urban Kenyan households (16 percent) while no Shona household uses these materials. Some urban Kenyan households in specific areas within cities—mostly on the outskirts of urban centers or within irregular settlements—often use unimproved floor materials (such as earth, sand, and dung) due to lack of resources to buy improved materials and other constraints. At the county level, for the Shona community, the use of cement is more common for houses in Kiambu than in Nairobi (92 percent vs.


²⁶ Improved housing, referred to as modern housing in DHS Analytical Studies, is defined as having improved floor, wall, and roof construction. <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/AS61/AS61.pdf>

FIGURE 10: Type of floor material for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

FIGURE 11: Type of wall material for the Shona community and Kenyans




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

69 percent). However, for Kenyans, those living in Nairobi are almost as likely to use cement as those in Kiambu (78 percent vs. 73 percent, $p < 0.293$).

21. On average, most Shona community houses are built using stone with lime and cement. Almost half of Shona houses, mainly in Nairobi, have stone with lime or cement as wall materials, which is less than what is observed for nationals living in urban areas where cement blocks are more common (Figure 11). The use of stone with lime for walls is more common for Shona community houses in Nairobi than those in Kiambu. In contrast, Shona house walls in Kiambu are more likely to be built with corrugated iron sheets.


22. The Shona community households occupy roughly the same number of rooms as urban Kenyan households, but the density of use is higher than the national urban average. Crowded conditions—measured by both space within a housing unit and distance between them—can lead to increased morbidity and stress (World Health Organization 2018). On average, the Shona community households occupy 1.8 habitable rooms compared to 1.7 in urban Kenya. However, the higher average number of household members among the Shona translates into 3.1 persons occupying each habitable room compared to 2.1 in urban Kenya ($p<0.01$; Figure 12). At the county level, the Shona community households in Nairobi and Kiambu occupy fewer rooms and are more likely to be crowded into a room (having 3 or more individuals occupying a room) than their respective nationals. Crowded conditions are more pronounced in Nairobi County than in Kiambu County for both Shona and Kenyans (Figure 13).

► **FIGURE 12:** Number of habitable rooms for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 13:** Proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

ii. Water and sanitation

23. The Shona community households have similar access to improved drinking water as Kenyans living in urban areas, although less access than nationals in Nairobi and Kiambu counties. Nationally, Kenya has made strides toward improving access to drinking water, with 73 percent of households reporting improved access, compared to 59 percent 10 years before.²⁷ In urban Kenya, 87 percent of households have access to improved drinking water, similar to the Shona community average of 88 percent (Figure 14). However, at the Nairobi and Kiambu county levels, Kenyans have better access than the Shona community (p<0.01).

24. The Shona community reports lower access to improved sanitation, and they share toilets more often than nationals. Poor sanitation conditions and waste disposal practices contribute to the spread of infectious diseases and are linked to poorer development outcomes, including education and gender-based violence (Kayser et al. 2018; Singavarapu and Murray 2013; World Health Organization 2008, 2019). About 83 percent of the Shona population have access to an improved sanitation facility compared to 87 percent of households in urban Kenya (p<0.01; Figure 15). At the county level, nationals in Kiambu have higher access to improved sanitation than the Shona community (96 percent vs. 74 percent, p<0.01). However, an opposite trend is noted in Nairobi (93 percent nationals vs. 97 percent Shona, p<0.05). In addition, toilet sharing is more common among the Shona community than among nationals, especially in Kiambu County (Figure 16). About 77 percent of households in the Shona community share a toilet facility with other household members compared to 66 percent among urban nationals (p<0.01).


► **FIGURE 14:** Access to drinking water for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).


²⁷ https://sun-connect-news.org/fileadmin/DATEIEN/Dateien/New/KNBS_-_Basic_Report.pdf

► **FIGURE 15:** Access to improved sanitation for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 16:** Sharing of toilet facilities for the Shona community and Kenyans




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

iii. Energy

25. About 9 in 10 Shona community households have access to the electricity grid compared to about 6 in 10 urban Kenyan households ($p < 0.01$; Figure 17). At the county level, while the use of electricity is the most common source of lighting for both the Shona community and nationals in Nairobi (90 percent vs. 91 percent), the Shona community average in Kiambu is greater than the national average (92 percent vs. 87 percent, $p < 0.095$). Interestingly, Shona households are more likely than nationals in Nairobi and Kiambu to use solar or biogas energy for lighting ($p < 0.01$). It is likely that the access rate for urban Kenyan households at the national level is lower than that of Shona households because this group includes households in smaller cities far away from the capital. Thus, they may have lower access than the areas surrounding the capital of Nairobi, where the Shona community resides. In Kenya, a national ID card or a passport is required to have access to an electricity connection. Thus, Shona households may be pushed to incur illicit connections or rely on individuals with valid IDs to hire the service for them, for which they may pay unofficial fees. This only heightens the imperative to provide proper documentation to minimize risks related to illicit connections (e.g., fire, electrocution, or other accidents) and reduce unofficial fee collections.

► **FIGURE 17:** Source of lighting for the Shona community and Kenyans




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

BOX 4


Kenya RRPS insights on access to health facilities

Most Shona report lower access to health facilities than before the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in March 2020, mainly due to fear of getting infected by the virus. More than 7 in 10 Shona community households report lower access to health facilities after the outbreak of the pandemic, compared to nearly 3 in 10 nationals ($p < 0.01$; Figure 18). This is similar to the reported access of urban refugees. The main reason for having lower access to health facilities is fear of getting infected with the virus, which was cited by almost all Shona community households (Figure 19). The lower access to health facilities could have an impact on the general health conditions of persons of concern beyond the pandemic, and their ability to cope with it.

► **FIGURE 18:** Lower access to health facilities than before March 2020



► **FIGURE 19:** Reasons for lower access to health facilities



Source: Kenya COVID-19 RRPS (2020).


Note: More details in online dashboard: www.kenyacovidtracker.org

iv. Education

26. Most Shona report having attended school at least once in their life, though gender differences are noticeable. Overall, 89 percent of the Shona population ages 15 years and above have attended school, including 92 percent of men and 87 percent of women (Figure 20). These numbers fall below the national averages in urban areas (95 percent). Furthermore, men in urban Kenya are more likely to have attended school than women (97 percent vs. 93 percent, $p<0.01$; Figure 20).

27. Shona community children are less likely to be attending primary school than their national counterparts. As measured by the Net Attendance Rate (NAR) and the Gross Attendance Rate (GAR), which can exceed 100 percent as it includes overage students,²⁸ 81 percent of primary-school age (6–13 years) Shona community children reportedly attend school (Figure 21). No gender differences in the primary attendance rates among the Shona community children are noted (Figure 22). The attendance rate goes up to 115 percent when students of all ages are considered, with women slightly more likely to enroll at later ages than males (117 percent compared to 114 percent; Figure 22). The higher participation of the Shona community children in primary education can be partly explained by the free primary education in Kenya and, up until 2018, no identity documents were required to enroll in primary school. In comparison, 86 percent of children ages 6–13 in urban Kenya attend primary school ($p<0.01$; Figure 21), increasing to 105 percent when all age groups are taken into consideration. At the county levels, nationals who are of primary school age living in Nairobi and Kiambu are about 10 percent more likely to be enrolled in primary school than their Shona counterparts.


► **FIGURE 20:** Distribution of population attended school, ages 15 and above



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).


²⁸ The NAR measures the attendance status of the official age group for a given level of education expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population. The GAR is the number of students attending a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education. By definition, the GAR is greater than NAR, and it can exceed 100 percent. The NAR helps determine whether school-age children are attending school at the correct age, whereas the GAR is important to determine the participation of overage participants, which is typically a characteristic of school children in developing countries.

► **FIGURE 21:** Primary attendance rates for the Shona community and nationals by county



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).


► **FIGURE 22:** Primary attendance rates, by county and gender



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).


28. At the secondary level, attendance rates are generally low, although nationals of secondary school age are twice as likely to attend school than Shona community children. For the Shona community, the secondary GAR is 50 percent, of which about half are of secondary school age (NAR is 28 percent). In contrast, 50 percent of secondary school-age nationals are enrolled in secondary school ($p < 0.01$; Figure 23), rising to 78 percent when considering nationals of all ages. The Shona community men have higher secondary attendance rates than women (65 percent compared to 37 percent; Figure 24). Comparing the gap in NAR and GAR, estimates show there is a greater propensity for both nationals and the Shona to enroll later in primary and secondary education. Late school entry could increase school dropout and also have negative impacts on children’s cognitive development (Chen 2017). The lower transition to secondary school for the Shona may partly be explained by the fact that a birth certificate is required to register for primary 8 (the last grade in primary) in order to continue to secondary (UNHCR Kenya 2017). Moreover, as the employment rate for Shona youth is higher than

► **FIGURE 23:** Secondary attendance rates by county



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 24:** Secondary school attendance rates, by county and gender




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

that of nationals, low secondary school attendance can also be explained by the high opportunity cost of going to school, suggesting that the Shona youth drop out of school to enter the labor market.


29. Educational attainment is low, especially for women and Shona community members. Almost all the Shona population and nationals who are 15 years and above and are not attending school have some form of education. However, educational attainment (completed or not) is generally low for the Shona community as most of them have only attained some primary education (Figure 25). This may be due to the requirement of a birth certificate to register for the last grade in primary school, which they lack, forcing them to drop out of school in the lower level. For the few that are able to make it to the secondary level, many are forced to drop out due to financial constraints. In turn, most nationals living in urban areas, who are currently not attending school, have either attained some primary or secondary education (73 percent), while 20 percent have attained at least some tertiary education (compared to 2 percent of Shona, $p < 0.01$). For both the Shona community and nationals, women are more likely to have no education (or less than primary) than men, although the difference is more pronounced for the Shona community (Figure 26).

► **FIGURE 25:** Educational achievement by county (15 years+, not currently attending)



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 26:** Educational achievement by county and gender (15 years+, not currently attending)




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

30. Literacy rates for urban nationals are higher than the Shona community average—and vary significantly by gender. About 89 percent of the Shona community ages 15 years and above are able to read and write in at least one language.²⁹ Across genders, 85 percent of women in this group are able to do so compared to 93 percent of men (Figure 27). In urban Kenya, 93 percent of those ages 15 years and older are literate in at least one language, with men and women having a literacy rate of 95 percent and 91 percent, respectively. Considering the two official languages in Kenya, the majority of the Shona community report being able to read and write in both English and Swahili (Figure 28). Still, Shona men are more likely to speak English or Swahili than women. Even though literacy is associated with higher levels of education and socioeconomic standing, and skill with an official national language of Kenya may help facilitate commercial opportunities, the lack of recognition as Kenya citizens can hinder the Shona from utilizing these skills to their full potential.


²⁹ No reading or writing tests were completed, and thus these are self-reported estimates.

► **FIGURE 27:** Population distribution, by ability to read and write in any language



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

► **FIGURE 28:** Population distribution among the Shona community, by literacy in official languages




Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).


Note: For literacy in English and Swahili, data is not available for Kenyans.

Most Shona children have been engaged in learning-related activities, mainly through reading school textbooks. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 15, 2020, the GoK closed schools and colleges nationwide, affecting about 17 million learners in the country. Until schools reopen in January 2021, the Ministry of Education has urged learners to engage in online learning or technology-mediated learning on TV, radio, educational apps, and smartphones. However, such learning means are not accessible for many persons of concern and national children. Even though almost 7 out of 10 Shona children ages 5-17 report being involved in some form of educational activities, similar to the national average and above the urban refugee average (Figure 29), the means for learning raise questions on efficacy (Figure 30). The lower access to e-learning platforms could be explained by the lack of technology (e.g., televisions, computers, or smartphones) needed to access these e-learning resources. Even among those households with access to technology, the associated costs may deter utilization.

► **FIGURE 29:** Engagement in learning activities in the last seven days



► **FIGURE 30:** Main learning-related activities



Source: Kenya COVID-19 RRPS (2020).


Note: More details in online dashboard: www.kenyacovidtracker.org

IV. Employment and Livelihoods

31. The Shona population is 4 percentage points more likely to be employed than urban nationals.

Among the Shona community, 73 percent of the working age population is employed, while 24 percent are outside the labor force (OLF). The remaining 2 percent who are available and looking for work are considered unemployed. Women are less likely to be employed than men (72 percent vs. 75 percent). Among Kenyans living in urban areas, 69 percent are employed, 26 percent are OLF, and 4 percent are unemployed. In addition, similar to the Shona population, Kenyan men living in urban areas are more likely to be employed than their female counterparts (76 percent vs. 62 percent, $p < 0.01$; Figure 31).

► **FIGURE 31:** Labor force participation for the Shona community and Kenyans



Source: Shona SES (2019) and KIHBS (KNBS 2015/16).

Labor force participation


The standard UN/ILO labor force framework is used to understand employment dynamics. According to this approach, the working-age population is defined as all individuals ages 15–64 years. An employed person is someone who has reported having worked (with or without pay or profit) for at least one hour in the last seven days or was temporarily absent from a job to which they maintained a formal attachment. Unemployed persons are those who were without work during the seven-day reference period but were available and actively seeking work in the four weeks leading up to the survey. Together, these two groups make up the economically active population. The remaining share of the working-age population is outside the labor force (OLF) and considered economically inactive according to the national definition. This category includes full-time students, homemakers, those unable to work due to a disability, and so forth, as well as the group of discouraged jobless persons who were available to work but not actively seeking (or actively seeking but not available, although this subgroup is often negligible). The latter part of the inactive population can be referred to as the “potential labor force.”

Furthermore, Shona community members ages 15 to 24 years are more likely to be employed than nationals of the same age ($p < 0.05$), which partly explains why Shona youth are less likely than nationals to engage in secondary and higher education (Figure 24).

32. The most common work activity among the Shona population is self-employment, while for nationals the most common activity is wage employment. Among those who report being employed in the last seven days, 78 percent of the Shona population reported working for themselves or having a nonfamily business enterprise compared to 30 percent of nationals in urban areas (Figure 32). The lack of recognition as citizens in Kenya, coupled with the lack of identity cards, prevent the Shona from being formally employed. Therefore, they are more likely to earn a living by doing informal work such as basket weaving, mostly for women, and carpentry, mainly for men (UNHCR Kenya 2017). Furthermore, the lack of documents forces Shona community self-employees to sell their products below market value through middlemen and intermediaries. With respect to wage employment, only 24 percent of the Shona population reported working for wages compared to 58 percent of nationals in urban areas. Volunteering, mainly in churches, is common among the Shona community, with 13 percent involved in this kind of activity. While there is no gender difference among the Shona population in terms of activity done in the last seven days, national women are more likely to be self-employed and working in agriculture than their male counterparts (Figure 33).

33. Among those OLF, the main reason for not working is schooling. About 66 percent of the Shona population OLF cite their status as full-time students (Figure 34). Of those full-time students, 73 percent are ages 15–18 years while 5 percent are between 19 and 25 years old. This means that this population is accumulating human capital and skills, and if measures are put in place to expand the labor market to absorb these potential future entrants, overall well-being and standards of living in the future can be improved. Family responsibilities also account for 6 percent of inactivity while 6 percent

► **FIGURE 32:** Type of work activity in the last seven days, for Shona and nationals



Source: Shona SES (2019).

Note: Percentages do not sum up to 100 percent since persons may have engaged in more than one activity.


► **FIGURE 33:** Type of work activity in the last seven days by gender, for Shona and nationals



Note: Percentages do not sum up to 100 percent since persons may have engaged in more than one activity.

Source: Shona SES (2019).

► **FIGURE 34:** Main reason for not working or looking for a job in last four weeks




Source: Shona SES (2019).

BOX 7

Kenya RRPS insights on employment


Employment rates, wage employment earnings, and household business revenues have sharply dropped after the COVID-19 outbreak. The employment rates of the Shona have decreased sharply from 73 percent (Figure 31) to 22 percent (Figure 35) with only 11 percent of urban refugees employed, while the overall national employment rate fell from 72 to 53 percent (differences across groups $p < 0.01$). The mitigation measures imposed by the GoK have affected the informal sector the most where the majority of the Shona were employed before the pandemic. About 70 percent of Shona business owners and 63 percent of urban refugee business owners who are still operating reported a decrease in revenue (Figure 36). Even though only a few Shona were involved in wage employment prior to the pandemic, a decrease in the number of hours worked has translated into losses in income, as 88 percent report a decrease in their earnings (Figure 37).

► **FIGURE 35:** Employed in the last seven days



Source: Kenya COVID-19 RRPS (2020).


► **FIGURE 36:** Changes in revenue among the self-employed



Source: Kenya COVID-19 RRPS (2020).

Note: More details in online dashboard: www.kenyacovidtracker.org

► **FIGURE 37:** Changes in earnings among paid employees



have been OLF in the last seven days because they are sick or incapacitated. In addition, 4 percent report a lack of employment opportunities as the reason why they have not worked. For nationals living in urban Kenya, 59 percent of those OLF are full-time students while 21 percent are OLF because of family responsibilities.

34. Among those OLF, 13 percent are discouraged jobseekers, mainly due to the unavailability of jobs in the area and family responsibilities. This population constitutes the potential labor force—defined as persons not in the labor force who are available but no longer looking for work due to specific labor market-related reasons. Among this population, about 28 percent cite no jobs available in the area as the main reason for not searching despite being available themselves, and 22 percent cite themselves as homemakers. Women are more likely to be discouraged than men and their reasons for not seeking jobs differ from men. Women often cite family responsibilities (26 percent vs. 15 percent) as the main reason while men often cite unavailability of jobs in the area (31 percent vs. 26 percent). Irrespective of the reasons given for not seeking jobs despite being available, these potential workers are generally considered as being underutilized. When job placement services are improved (for instance, promoting job creation, facilitating job search processes, and helping potential employers find potential seekers), these people might change their minds and look for work, which increases employment rates and overall labor force participation.

V. County Trends

35. The Shona community living in Kiambu County are poorer, live in worse housing conditions, and have lower educational outcomes compared to their counterparts in Nairobi County. The Shona living in Kiambu are 9 percentage points more likely to be poor than those living in Nairobi County (56 percent vs. 49 percent). The lower incidence of poverty among the Shona in Nairobi compared to

their counterparts in Kiambu could be explained by the larger market access in Nairobi, which translates into higher income. The Shona community in Kiambu has a larger household size, lower access to improved sanitation, and is more likely to share toilets with other households. The Shona houses in Kiambu are also more likely to be constructed with unimproved housing materials compared to houses in Nairobi (52 percent vs. 12 percent). Even though both counties have similar primary school attendance rates, secondary school attendance rates are lower for those in Kiambu County (26 percent vs. 31 percent in Nairobi). While the same proportion of boys of secondary school age attend school in both counties (29 percent), Shona girls living in Nairobi are more likely to attend school than their peers in Kiambu (32 percent vs. 24 percent). The lower educational attainment for the Shona is worse in Kiambu County, as only 13 percent have some secondary or higher education compared to 19 percent for those in Nairobi County.

36. The Shona community households in both counties are mostly headed by men and show similar employment rates, dependency ratios, access to drinking water, and sources of lighting. In both counties, there are an equal number of men as women; however, men are more likely to make the daily decisions in the household. Employment rates are high and similar, as 7 out of 10 in the working-age population in both counties report working in the last seven days; however, this does not translate into a lower poverty headcount, which is partly explained by the higher economic burden on the working population and their involvement in informal working activities. Nearly half of the population in both counties are below 18 years of age (49 percent in Kiambu and 47 percent in Nairobi), leading to a high dependency ratio. As for access to drinking water and energy for lighting, almost all Shona households in Kiambu and Nairobi have access to improved drinking water and electricity grids.



Conclusions and Recommendations

37. Even though significant efforts have been made to identify, prevent, and reduce statelessness, millions of people in the world remain stateless, and the lack of socioeconomic data prevents efforts to adequately address their needs. Since the launch of the #IBelong Campaign and its efforts in identifying and reducing statelessness, more than 166,000 stateless persons have acquired or had their nationality confirmed, and many states have complied with the statelessness conventions. However, the lack of data on stateless communities and the difficulty in identifying who precisely these persons are, still leave an estimated millions of persons stateless and at risk of statelessness. Despite often living their entire lives in a single country, stateless persons lack a nationality, thereby facing limitations in the exercise of human rights such as education, health, and employment opportunities. Furthermore, without proper documentation, it can be difficult to engage in the labor force, acquire permits to work or drive, or purchase property. “The very nature of statelessness means it is difficult to determine exactly how many people are affected, or at risk,” (United Nations, 2018). Together, the impacts of statelessness are felt not only on the individuals concerned, but also on society as a whole, which benefits from the full participation of all residents. And therefore, important data gaps persist, preventing efforts to address stateless persons’ needs through evidence-based policies and programming.

38. Comparable data on stateless populations and nationals are necessary to inform policy planning and programming to reduce the negative impacts of statelessness, while data on the impacts of crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic can help mitigate its effects. Micro-data collection through household surveys, as carried out for the Shona community in Kenya, can contribute to filling socioeconomic data gaps while supporting the objectives of the #IBelong campaign. The Shona SES is a result of continued efforts to resolve statelessness in Kenya and build the nascent body of work on stateless communities. It provides the first poverty and socioeconomic comparisons of stateless and non-stateless populations in Kenya, contributing toward fill data gaps and enhancing the evidence base for the efficient design of programmatic and policy interventions. Frequent data collection exercises—as carried out for the COVID-19 RRPS—can also contribute to the design of timely measures to mitigate socioeconomic shocks on vulnerable populations, such as the stateless Shona community.

39. Building and maintaining human capital among the Shona community, especially among girls and women, emerges as a policy priority. Even though the gender distribution is balanced in population size, the Shona community is younger than urban nationals, which translates into a higher economic burden on working-age adults. In addition, young Shona people have lower access to education than nationals, especially for secondary school, which is partly explained by a higher employment rate among Shona youth (15 to 24 years) compared to national youth. With the right education and employment opportunities, the youth bulge in the Shona population can be turned into a demographic dividend. Substantial investment is needed to build and maintain human capital by improving access to education and supporting the transition to secondary school, especially among secondary school-age children. Removing barriers such as the requirement of birth certificates, and enhancing access to income generating opportunities among adults of nonschool age will be key in supporting access

to education for Shona children and youth. Policy interventions must incorporate gender-responsive approaches that address barriers faced by women and girls, which include early marriage and the disproportionate responsibility of domestic work. These barriers limit their economic and empowerment opportunities, and thereby trap them in a cycle of poverty. Notably, increasing access to education among the Shona population will be crucial in reducing the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

40. Strengthening job-related skills, increasing work opportunities, and understanding barriers to formal employment can help improve living standards among the Shona community. An estimated 74 percent of the Shona working-age population are employed, compared to 69 percent at the urban national level. Despite having a higher employment rate, the Shona community is poorer than Kenyan nationals (53 percent vs. 36 percent). About 8 in 10 employed Shona people are self-employed, although, as reflected by their poverty rate, earnings from such employment may not be enough to cover their basic needs. Strengthening job-related skills through programs linked to work opportunities can be instrumental in increasing employment rates and addressing market needs. In addition, the higher literacy rate among the Shona, especially in Kenya's official languages, is a job skill that can be used to boost their employment opportunities, while constituting a tool in advocating for their citizenship. Furthermore, a deeper understanding of barriers to formal employment can help inform targeted policies to improve livelihoods. Such an understanding can be accomplished by undertaking additional studies on livelihoods and employment among stateless communities.

41. Investing in health, education, and livelihood strategies can help mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence from the Kenya RRPS shows that most Shona community members report lower access to health facilities than before the COVID-19 outbreak, mainly due to fear of getting infected with the virus. Ensuring access to safe health care for non-COVID-19-related health concerns can help reduce the risk of overwhelming the health system and future health crises (due to not addressing non-COVID-19-related health problems). While most Shona children are engaged in some form of learning activities, the main mediums for learning raise questions on their effectiveness. Providing homeschooling materials and increasing access to e-learning can support children's education and prevent students from falling behind. Employment rates, earnings, and business revenues have sharply dropped. Targeted cash transfers, increased access to financial services, and information campaigns on existing support programs can help reduce impacts on livelihoods.

42. Recognizing and registering the Shona stateless community can have a great impact on their socioeconomic lives and livelihood opportunities. The lack of identity documents has been the greatest obstacle to fully access basic human rights such as education, health, and employment among the Shona community in Kenya. Identity documentation requirements to enroll in primary school and transition to secondary education can force Shona community children to drop out of school. As a survival mechanism, some parents have made arrangements with "Kenyan parents" so that their children could continue school. However, this is an unsustainable option that is not available for all. Moreover, the lack of national identity documents prevents the Shona community from accessing formal employment and leaves them with no option but to engage in informal work and utilize the services of middlemen, where they are often exploited. Even though the Kenyan government has taken steps to address the issue by establishing a national taskforce for the identification and registration of eligible stateless persons as Kenyan citizens, a significant amount of work still lies ahead. Direct government interventions, and further advocacy can support integration of this community into social services, the formal labor market, and ultimately, the socioeconomic development of the nation.



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
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Appendix A. Locations of Interviewed Shona Households in Kenya

► **FIGURE A.1:** Map of location of interviewed Shona households in Kenya



Source: Shona preregistration activity (UNHCR 2019).

Appendix B. Methodology

Survey design and implementation

43. The Shona study, which comprises the Shona SES and preregistration activity, is intended to cover the entire Shona population living in Kenya. The Shona population was identified to be living in and around Nairobi County, specifically Githurai and Hurlingham in Nairobi County, and Kiambaa and Kinoo in Kiambu County; hence, the study was initially designed to cover these four main areas which comprise urban households only. During a pilot study in March 2019, it was noticed that a significant number of the Shona had moved to other areas in these counties due to rising living costs, and others moved elsewhere in Kenya, such as to Meru and Mombasa due to family reasons or as missionaries. The study was therefore extended in principle to cover these areas.

44. The Shona households were identified using a full household listing exercise conducted by KNBS and UNHCR, with Shona community elders as key informants. A full listing exercise, conducted in two steps, was used to ensure that every Shona household and individual was enumerated. In the first step of the listing exercise, Shona households were listed based on information provided by the Shona community elders. In the second step, a “snowball” approach was used, where each of the households listed in the first step was asked if they knew of any additional Shona households inside or outside the four main areas—Githurai, Hurlingham, Kiambaa, and Kinoo. The households that were located inside the four main areas were subsequently listed directly, whereas households located farther away had their phone numbers and locations of residence recorded.

45. The Shona households in this report cover households living in the main areas, excluding Hurlingham and rural Kiambu. Households in Hurlingham are excluded from the Shona SES because these households are part of a religious order who maintain significantly different living conditions than the average population. Hurlingham households comprise 10 percent of the sampling area. These households are comprised exclusively of women, with a median age of 37 years, average household size of 1.4, and a dependency ratio of 0.2. To make the analysis representative of households in the main study areas, the additional households located in other areas of Kenya are excluded from the analysis. Households who live in rural Kiambu are also excluded as the number of observations collected are insufficient to calculate the poverty rate (Table B.1).

46. The questionnaire used in the Shona SES produces data comparable to national household surveys and other standard instruments. Modules on education, employment, household characteristics, and consumption and expenditure are aligned with the most recent national poverty survey, KIHBS 2015/16, and provide comparable results reported at the county and national levels (Table B.3). Based on KNBS guidelines, a Shona community household was defined as a group of people who live together, share meals, and recognize the same and only one head of household among them. In addition to this, following the same definition also used by the paralleled preregistration activity, the household must have at least one person who identifies as Shona, that is, was either born in Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, or can be linked to these countries through past or current marriage or direct ancestors such as parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents who migrated to Kenya.

47. Estimates of national averages are calculated using 2015/16 KIHBS from the KNBS. KIHBS data used to obtain estimates of the national averages in this report are downloaded from KNBS. Nationally

► **TABLE B.1:** Households that completed the various sections of the SES questionnaire

County	Study area	Total population in the study area	Number of households interviewed for SES without consumption module	Number of households that did not receive consumption module	Number of households that refused to inform consent for consumption module	Number of households that completed SES, with consumption module	Number of households included in report
Nairobi	Githurai	38	37	—	1	36	36
	Hurlingham	47	47	47	—	—	—
	Other areas	85	84	1	1	82	82
Kiambu	Kiambaa	105	105	—	—	105	105
	Kinoo	105	105	—	—	105	105
	Other areas	19	19	2	—	17	—
Other counties	Other areas in Kenya	66	66	31	—	35	—
Total		465	463	81	2	380	328

Source: Authors' own calculation.

Note: "Number of households that did not receive consumption module" consists of the 47 institutional households in Hurlingham who were intentionally excluded from the module because they maintain significantly different living conditions than the average population, and the remaining 33 households were wrongly excluded from the module.

► **TABLE B.2:** Sample allocation for KIHBS 2015/16

County	Number of households	Rural	Urban
Nairobi	554		554
Kiambu	511	285	226
National	21,773	13,092	8,681

Source: KIHBS 2015/16.

Note: Only urban national and Kiambu households were considered for the comparative analysis with urban Shona households.

► **TABLE B.3:** Shona questionnaires for registration and SES

Module	Respondent	Based on KIHBS 2015/16
Introduction, informed consent, and location	Head	
Household roster	Individual	
Registration	Individual	
Education	Individual	✓
Employment	Individual	✓
Household characteristics	Head	✓
Consumption and expenditure	Head	✓

Source: Authors' illustration.


representative estimates from the KIHBS data are compared to population figures from the Shona SES data to enable comparisons of socioeconomic indicators between the Shona and Kenyan populations. Comparisons between the Shona and nationals were done at the urban level, thus the national rural sample at the national and Kiambu county levels was dropped from the analysis (Table B.2). Therefore, Shona urban households in Kiambu and Nairobi were compared to urban national households in such counties. P-values from one-sample t-tests to test for differences between the KIHBS estimates and the known Shona population values are shown throughout the main report. Confidence intervals (95 percent) are also provided for figures based on the national estimates.

48. Poverty is measured by comparing the household aggregate consumption expenditure to the national urban poverty line. The measure of household consumption expenditure consists of the sum of two components—food and nonfood consumption. The food consumption component includes food items that were consumed over a seven-day period, with data collected according to the respondent’s recall. The nonfood component of the aggregate includes consumption expenditures on energy, education, and other nonfood items such as clothing, footwear, and transport, etc. Recording any purchase of these items is based on the recall periods of either one month, three months, or one year, depending on how frequently the respective item is reasonably expected to be used. Rent amounts are also collected in the survey and included in the nonfood component. While actual rent values are used for those reporting rent, for missing household rent, rent is computed by using the regression coefficients from the 2015/16 KIHBS model on the Shona SES household characteristics. To construct the nonfood aggregate, all reported amounts are converted to the same reference period of one week and then aggregated for each household. Both the nominal food and nonfood consumption components are converted to the same reference period of one month and then adjusted for spatial differences in cost of living using the Paasche price index from 2015/16 KIHBS for Nairobi and Kiambu counties. Finally, the aggregate consumption expenditures are deflated to 2015/16 using the Kenya Consumer Price Index (CPI) to make it comparable to the 2015/16 Kenya poverty line.

International poverty line and the Kenyan national poverty lines

49. The international poverty line, currently set at US\$1.90, is the universal standard for measuring extreme global poverty. It is calculated by taking the poverty threshold from each country and then converting it into dollars. It provides a consistent way of measuring poverty across countries. On the other hand, the national poverty line is mostly used for comparing poverty measures within a country. The current Kenya national poverty line was calculated with the 2015/16 KIHBS following the Cost of Basic Need (CBN) method. The CBN method defines a consumption bundle required to meet one’s basic consumption needs. The cost of this consumption bundle is then estimated using reference prices for either rural or urban prices. Thus, unlike the international poverty line which does not differentiate between urban and rural, there are two national poverty lines, the urban poverty line of K Sh 5,995 and rural poverty line of K Sh 3,252. In the classification of urban and rural households in the poverty estimation, KIHBS classifies peri-urban households as being rural because the socioeconomic conditions of these households are closer to their rural counterparts than the core urban counterparts. The opposite is observed in the Shona study where peri-urban households are similar to core-urban than rural; hence, they are classified as urban. While the national urban poverty line includes rent in

► **FIGURE B.1:** Poverty headcount for the Shona community and Kenyans (international poverty line)



Source: Shona SES (2019).

its calculation, the international poverty line does not. In this report, the national poverty line is chosen over the international poverty line, mainly because the majority of households report paying rent (93 percent), and rent forms a significant share of household total expenditure (16 percent). Excluding it would underestimate the poverty rate. Since there are not enough observations for any meaningful calculation of the poverty rates for rural households (17 households), they are excluded from the main analysis. Nevertheless, the poverty headcount for the Shona and Kenyans using the international poverty line is shown in Figure B.1.

